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DETERMINED FUTURITY IN GREEK

(Concluded from page 181)

B. *The Greek Optative of Determined Futurity*

The meaning of determined futurity is easily derived from that of wish. An expression of wish differs from an expression of will in that in the former the speaker does not have in mind the bringing about of the desired action or situation either through his own activity or by influencing the will of another. Two cases may be distinguished. (1) The action or situation desired is seen to be one that might be brought about by the efforts of the speaker himself. In such a case the desired action is seen to be in accordance with the plan of the speaker. 'May I smite the ship', in case the act lies in the speaker's power, implies 'it is my plan to smite the ship'. The more thoroughly the action is under the control of the speaker, the plainer becomes the implication that it is bound to take place in accordance with a plan of action adopted. (2) The action or situation desired may be seen to be one entirely removed from the speaker's control and under the control of fate, nature, etc. In such a case the implication easily arises that the action desired is bound to happen in accordance with some law.

Under the circumstances indicated under (1) the idea of wish attached to the optative became weakened and the implication became more prominent. Thus was developed the meaning of *personal* determined futurity. 'I wish to smite' became 'I am to smite (in accordance with my plan)'¹⁴. As in the corresponding use of the subjunctive, the first person will here be most common. Compare Od. 12.388, 'But as for me, I am (in accordance with my plan) soon to smite . . .'; Il. 24.370, 'But I will in no way harm you; and more, I am to protect you from any other'. Other examples are Il. 15.70, 21.358, 9.157; Od. 4.348, 21.77, 15.506, 14.155.

Such expressions are *in effect* expressions of *resolve*; and English translators with practical unanimity use the auxiliary 'will'. But what is said directly is that something is bound to happen; and 'shall' in the sense

of 'am to' is a more exact translation. Translations of some examples show more variety. Compare Od. 3.365: *ἐνθα κε λεξαίμην κοίλῃ παρὰ νηὶ μελαίνῃ* . . . Palmer translates with "would"; and this auxiliary is used by Butcher and Lang in translating Od. 15.314, 21.113. For the latter, Palmer uses "might". But Telemachus is announcing his purpose; Bryant's "I am moved to try" does very well. Od. 22.262, 15.448, and 15.452, variously translated, are all expressions of determined futurity of the kind under discussion. Od. 19.598 may belong here; or Penelope may mean that in accordance with the decrees of fate she is to lie down, and so Palmer's translation, "must", may be justified.

A considerable number of examples with the first person plural are of the same type as the cases just noticed. While the action is to be performed by the speaker and those associated with him, the course of conduct adopted is that of the speaker alone. Most often the persons who are to take part in the action are persons addressed; and the expression takes on the character of an exhortation. Compare Il. 10.344. This Bryant translated by, "Then let us rush and seize him". 'Then are we to seize' might serve as a rendering. Other examples are Il. 24.664, 20.427, 13.741, 14.79; Od. 10.268, 16.305.

Examples with the second or the third person of determined futurity having as determinant the course of action adopted are extremely rare. I have noted only Il. 1.301, 'Thereof thou shalt not take anything or bear it away against my will' (LLM.), and Il. 19.209. It would have been easy to express the idea in the latter passage with the first person.

There are not many examples in Homer of sentence-questions with the optative. Nearly all of these contain the second person and in all the act inquired about is in reality that of the person or persons spoken to. The passages of one group contain *οὐκ ἄν*. They are questions concerning what is to happen in accordance with the plan of the person addressed: 'are you not to (in accordance with your plan)?' Such a question easily becomes *in effect* a request. Compare Il. 24.263, 'Are ye not to (LLM. "will ye not") make me ready a wain?' With second person are Il. 5.456; Od. 6.57, 7.22. Il. 5.32 has first person plural; Il. 10.204 has third person singular. Three passages, Il. 4.93, 14.190, and 7.48, are without a negative and without *ἄν* or *κε*. They also in effect express a request. Whether the

¹⁴Not the least of the difficulties with the current theories of a 'potential' optative is the difficulty of deriving the potential meaning or meanings from the wish meaning. No more satisfactory than others is the explanation of Delbrück, N. J. 9 (1902), 326 ff. Concerning this Lattmann, N. J. 10 (1903), 410 ff., remarks, "Das Ganze ist eine rein hypothetische Konstruktion ohne psychologische Wahrscheinlichkeit". For Hale's conception of the development see P.A.P.A. 32. cxxi ff.

modal meaning is that of wish or of determined futurity, it is impossible to say.

In an expression of wish concerning an act seen to be under the control of something outside of the speaker—fate, nature, etc.—, the implication may arise that the act is *bound* to take place. It was in such cases, by the weakening of the wish idea and the coming into prominence of the implication, that the impersonal determined futurity meaning of the optative developed.

Examples of the *impersonal* determined futurity will most commonly occur with the second or the third person. First are given examples with the third person: Od. 17.546, 'An impartial death is bound to strike the suitors' (Palmer gives "shall"); Il. 2.12, 'For lo, the hour is come That gives into his hands the city of Troy With all its spacious streets' (Bryant). In Od. 22.350 a simple statement of futurity is not sufficient for Phemius's purpose. He wishes to impress on Odysseus that circumstances are such that Telemachus cannot avoid speaking in his defense.

With more of the ethical determinant is Od. 18.414, 'One is bound (ethically) not to'. "None should be angry and retort" (Palmer). Here, as elsewhere, we must insist that the determinant involved is no part of the meaning of the mood. Compare the examples given below of the second person used similarly.

In Od. 4.692 we have a determined future optative and a determined future subjunctive side by side. Another example of the optative is Il. 13.815.

With the second person we have the following with no peculiarities to be noted, Il. 21.412, 9.303, and 6.456–457. If the act or state is one not desired by the actor such an expression takes on the character of a warning. Compare Od. 22.325.

In the three examples that follow the determinant is quite clearly ethical: and in telling what the person addressed is ethically bound not to do the expression becomes in effect a mild prohibition: Il. 2.250 *οὐκ ἂν δροπέβοις*, 'You are bound not to harangue', "Do not" (Buckley), "You sha'n't" (Leaf). To lay emphasis on the ethical determinant we may translate by 'You ought not to'; Il. 14.127 *οὐκ ἂν . . . ἀριμῆσαιτε*, 'You are not to dishonor', 'Do not', 'You should not'; Od. 20.135. Here the specification of an ethical determinant is more evident on account of *ἀναισχρον*. And so Butch and Lang well translate, "Nay, my child, thou *shouldest* not now blame her where no blame is!"¹⁶

¹⁶Concerning the Latin subjunctive of obligation much has been written with incidental reference to a supposed Greek optative with that meaning. Compare especially Delbrück, *Verg. Syn.* 2.389; Elmer, A. J. P. 15.213 ff., and in *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* (= Cornell Studies in Classical Philology VI), 213 ff.; Hale, T. A. P. A. 31.148, and P. A. P. A. 39.30; Bennett, *Critique of Some Recent Subjunctive Theories* (= Cornell Studies in Classical Philology IX), 1 ff., and *Syntax of Early Latin* 1.180; Frank, C. P. 3.5. ff.; Sonnenschein, *Unity*, 18. I cannot here discuss the Latin expressions cited as examples of this meaning except to say that, to my mind, they are nearly all examples of determined futurity. *Cur non laeter* means 'Why am I not to rejoice (naturally or logically)?' *Alis rebus pietatem colas* is 'In other matters one is to follow duty' (in accordance with ethical law). *Non tu credas* is 'You are not to believe'. The particular determinant involved in any one of these expressions is no more expressed by the mood of the verb than it is

With the first person the examples under this head are few. Compare Il. 4.171, 'It is fated that I return'; 19.218, 'Naturally I am bound to surpass'.

To the examples of determined futurity already given a number may be added in which *indifference* is implied by the circumstances¹⁶. Compare Il. 24.619, 'And afterward you shall mourn over your son'; Od. 21.162 (16.391). This implication occurs more commonly with the true optative, without *ἄν* or *κε*, as in Od. 7.224. It occurs also with the subjunctive of determined futurity, as in Od. 1.394 quoted above (page 180). The indifference may be indicated by stating two mutually exclusive alternatives, as in Od. 8.570–571 and Il. 22.253, with which should be compared Od. 14.183 and Il. 9.701 with the subjunctive. In Il. 18.308 one alternative is expressed by the subjunctive, the other by the optative.

The optative of impersonal determined futurity occurs in questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun or adverb. Compare Il. 17.586, 'Hector, what other of the Achaeans shall (LLM. give "will") fear thee any more?' Other examples are Il. 17.260, 149 (with *πῶς κε*). Still others virtually of the same character are mentioned below, page 187.

As in sentences with the subjunctive of determined futurity, so in sentences with the optative of the same meaning, when attention is called to effort on the part of the agent, there arises an implication of *capacity* or of *opportunity*; 'he is to (if he tries)' implies 'he can' or 'he may'¹⁷.

The most common source of the 'may-can' implication is the negative. In case the verb is one of effort, the negative calls attention to the failure of the agent to overcome circumstances. Compare Od. 19.285, 'So many gainful ways. . . Odysseus understands; another man shall not match him' ('no other man can'¹⁸); Od. 15.321, 'No other mortal man is to (can, may) vie with me'; Il. 9.376, 'But never again shall he beguile

by our English 'is to'. For the examples with the second person there is the same suggestion of command pointed out above as belonging to the Greek examples. Euripides, *Phoenissae* 524–525, a translation of which appears in Cicero *De Off.* 3.82 and which Elmer cites in support of his interpretation of *pietatem colas*, might better be cited in defense of the determined futurity meaning. Evidently the meaning of *χρή* in the conditional clause is 'it is necessary', 'one is to', 'one must'; and the meaning of *χρεών* is not different. The ethical determinant is suggested by *εὐσεβεῖν*.

"Since, if we *must* o'erleap the narrow bound
Of justice, for an empire to transgress
Were glorious; we in every point beside
Are bound to act as virtue's rules enjoin".

¹⁶It is possible that we should see in such examples and in corresponding examples with the subjunctive an intermediate stage in the development of the determined futurity meaning. Compare Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, 1.24.27, 199, and N. J. 9.330.

¹⁷There is no justification for applying the term *possibility* to the meaning of the 'may' and 'can' sometimes used in translating Greek optatives and Greek and Latin subjunctives. Possibility as distinguished from reality or actuality is probably not a modal meaning in any language.

I can not criticize here the recent discussions by scholars of the Greek and Latin 'potential': see Elmer, *Studies*, 175 ff.; Bennett, *Critique*, 31 ff.; Hale, T. A. P. A. 31.140 ff.; Elmer, T. A. P. A. 32.205 ff., and P. A. P. A. 32.117; Frank, C. P. 2.163 ff. Of these I am most nearly in agreement with Professor Frank.

¹⁸Sonnenschein, *Unity*, 36 ff., might well have quoted such a paratactic result sentence as this in support of his theory that the determined futurity (obligation) meaning is to be seen in Latin result clauses.

me with fair speech" (LLM.); Il. 8.143, 'In no way shall a man ward off the will of Zeus' ('In no way may'). Other similar examples are Il. 14.344; Od. 4.78, 17.268, 19.108, 23.126.

Such cases as Od. 4.167¹⁹ do not differ essentially from those just mentioned, though the optative occurs in a subordinate clause. Here the sense is 'Nor are there others who shall ward off ill (who can)'. Other similar examples are Od. 17.146, 9.126; Il. 5.192, 14.299, 5.484, 10.171. But in some of these, as in Od. 5.142, the idea of effort is weak and the implication of capacity or opportunity correspondingly slight. The clauses are descriptive clauses of determined futurity like Il. 23.345 and Od. 6.201 with the subjunctive, quoted above (page 180). The same kind of clause with the optative and *κε* but without a negative in the antecedent and without the 'can-may' implication occurs in Il. 1.64.

In interrogative sentences we may have the 'can-may' implication through the negative implication, as in Il. 9.77, 'Who shall (can) rejoice thereat?' Similar are Od. 10.574 and Il. 9.437.

The adverb *πεῖτα* may help to give the implication of capacity or opportunity, as in Od. 3.231, 'Easily shall a god, who will, bring a man safe from far' (Palmer, "may", Bryant "can"). But, if the modal meaning is that expressed in English by 'would', the implication of opportunity would be expressed by 'might'; and this is used in the Butcher and Lang translation. Similar is Il. 10.557, which Lang, Leaf, and Myers translate with "could".

In some cases the implication of capacity or of opportunity may arise from the meaning of the verb; the verb itself implies *successful* effort. I have listed Od. 2.268 above (page 185). One might translate *ἀνυξάλμει* there by 'we may escape'; but Palmer's "might" is hardly accurate from any point of view.

In Od. 11.144, a *πῶς* question, 'Tell me, my master, how is she to know that it is I?', the implication of capacity or opportunity, if present, comes directly from the meaning of *πῶς*, and not from the implied negative, as in Il. 9.437 above. As an example of an indirect question with the 'can-may' implication to be placed beside Il. 15.403 with the subjunctive we have Il. 11.792.

I have tried to indicate above (page 181) how easy is the passage from the meaning of determined futurity to that of contingent determined futurity. In an expression of contingent determined futurity, one definitely implies that all determining factors are *not* taken into consideration; but this is in reality true in an expression of determined futurity, though it is tacitly assumed that all *are* taken into consideration²⁰. In many cases it is possible for a speaker to express himself in either way, to say that something *shall* (*is bound to*) happen or that something *would* happen. Conversely in the case

of the optative with *δν* or *κε* we can not always be sure from the context with which meaning we have to deal. The following examples are probably to be considered *contingent* determined futurity; and yet the translations suggested are possibly correct; Il. 1.100, 'Then we shall persuade him'; Il. 2.160, 'But they shall leave to Priam Helen of Argos'. In Il. 4.173, 12.345, 21.561, the meaning of the optative is not certain.

Just as in the cases of determined futurity, so here in the cases of *contingent* determined futurity a distinction is to be made between the personal and the impersonal. For the most part examples with the first person will have the personal determinant and those with the second or the third person the impersonal determinant. The optative of the first person commonly retains something of its wish meaning. Compare Od. 8.467, "Then would I there too, as to any god, give thanks to you forever all my days" (Palmer).

I give the following list of examples with personal determinant; but no hard and fast line can be drawn between the meanings of contingent determined futurity and determined futurity, and so it is possible that some of these are to be considered as having the latter meaning. Moreover, it may be that in some of these cases the speaker may think of his action as determined by some outside force, such as fate, and not by his own plan of action. Il. 13.118, 19.206, 15.45, 13.486, 9.417, 15.45 (without *δν* or *κε*), 4.318, 14.245, 247, 248, 13.377 (with first person plural); Od. 17.561, 24.436, 11.489, 20.326, 18.166, 13.147, 3.232, 1.390, 19.346, 15.513.

The optative of personal contingent determined futurity is to be seen in some sentence-questions and with a suggestion of wish or willingness: Od. 15.431, "Say, wouldst thou now return home with us?" (Butcher and Lang); Od. 21.197, 18.357, 8.336.

A similar question with the interrogative pronoun is found in Od. 4.443, "And who would make his bed beside a monster of the sea?" (Palmer). Other examples are Il. 10.303, 24.367.

With the impersonal determinant we have the following examples. With first person (virtually), Od. 18.22, "Then I should have more peace tomorrow than today" (Palmer). So Il. 1.293, and, with the first person plural, Il. 2.81, 1.100, 10.247, 4.173.

An example with the second person follows: Od. 14.131, 'You too, old man, would soon be patching up a story'. Other examples are Il. 9.304; Od. 18.379-380, 2.185, 17.455; and, with the indefinite second person, negative except in the first case, Il. 15.696, 5.85, 4.223, 17.366, 4.429; Od. 3.124²¹.

A large number of examples have third person:

¹⁹Cf. Hale, "Extended" and "Remote" Deliberatives in Greek. T. A. P. A. 24.193, and in C. P. 6.374; Frank, C. P. 3.177 ff. I need hardly say that I consider the relative clause of *non habet quod det* in origin a descriptive clause of determined futurity.

²⁰What *would happen* is what *will* happen under certain imagined conditions. . . . The *would* is a will under the shadow of a mental reserve, and this shadow is cast by a condition which exists in the mind, but may not be expressed". So Sonnenschein, *Unity*, 45-47.

²¹At this point arises the question of the optative having to do with the past. The passages with indefinite second person cited from the *Iliad* deal with a past situation. The discussion lies outside the province of this paper.

compare Od. 13.141, 'Hard would it be to cast dishonor on our oldest and our best'. Such an example as Od. 6.285 may have the determined futurity meaning, "So will they talk, and for me it would prove a scandal" (Palmer). Perhaps the meaning is 'it is bound to prove'. Other examples are Il. 22.108, 17.417, 14.836, 17.105, 15.197, 9.601, 10.211-212, 24.463, 3.410, 6.410, 22.287, 24.213, 9.125, 10.57; Od. 21.322, 4.651, 9.131, 18.225, 24.435, 24.108, 11.330, 23.101, 19.569, 4.596.

Of the following questions with interrogative adverb some may have the implication of capacity and so be entitled to be included in the list given below. One example is Od. 9.351, "How should a stranger come?" (Palmer). Possibly, 'How could?' Other examples with $\pi\omega$ are Il. 19.82, 14.333; with $\pi\eta$, Od. 20.43; with $\pi\omicron\iota$, Od. 21.195; with $\pi\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$, Il. 19.227.

The implication of capacity or of opportunity may appear in sentences with the optative of contingent determined futurity. The English expression for the contingent determined futurity meaning plus that of capacity is 'would be able' or 'could'. The English 'might' expresses the contingent determined futurity meaning plus that of opportunity; it has the same relation to 'may' that 'could' has to 'can'.

Here again the implication of capacity or opportunity is made most clearly by the negative. So in Il. 14.335, the sense is 'I should not go', 'I should not be able', 'I could not', 'I might not'. With first person also Il. 19.321, and, with the second, Od. 7.293. In Il. 14.247-248 the two optatives may have the *impersonal* determinant; if so, the implication of capacity appears.

Examples with the third person are more common. Compare e.g. Od. 14.123, 'No traveler would (be able to) win'. Other examples are Il. 12.448, 20.359, 14.54, 1.272, 20.247, 6.522, 4.539, 12.59; Od. 12.84, 12.107, 23.188, 12.77, 12.88, 9.242, 16.244, 23.188, 16.196, 14.197, 20.392, 13.87. A negative is implied in the interrogative sentence in Od. 8.208, 22.12, 21.259, 10.384, 3.114, 4.649; Il. 19.90.

The 'could-might' implication appears in $\pi\omega$ s questions implying a negative. In Od. 1.65 the "should" of Butcher and Lang expresses the meaning of the mood, while Palmer's "could" adds the implication. In Od. 18.31 Palmer translates by "could", Butcher and Lang by "shouldst". For Od. 15.195 Palmer uses "could", Butcher and Lang "mightest". Other examples are Od. 8.352, 12.287 ($\pi\eta$); Il. 10.243.

In positive sentences the capacity or opportunity idea is even more clearly a mere implication and not a part of the modal meaning of the verb. Sometimes the verb itself has the meaning of *successful* accomplishment of some effort, as in Od. 12.102, 'You would succeed in shooting across', 'You would be able to'. Similar are Od. 14.325 (?), 19.294 (?). Sometimes the character of the subject calls attention to the matter of ability or opportunity, as in Il. 9.57. Similar are Od. 5.74, 22.138.

Sometimes the implication is helped out by an adverb, as in Il. 16.45 by $\beta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$. Similar are Il. 17.70 (with $\beta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$),

Od. 23.188 (with $\beta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ and a negative), and Od. 14.197 (with $\beta\eta\delta\iota\omega$ s and a negative). With $\alpha\lambda\psi\alpha$ we have Od. 15.317. Here Palmer translates with "could", Butcher and Lang with "might", and Monro (ad loc.) with "would". In the following the implication is fainter or non-existent: Od. 17.561, 13.147; Il. 13.486. In Od. 4.595 the slight implication comes from the phrase $\epsilon\lambda\varsigma \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\nu$. Butcher and Lang translate with "would". Compare the next line.

SALT LAKE CITY.

FRANK H. FOWLER.

REVIEW

A Short Historical Latin Grammar. By W. M. Lindsay. Second Edition. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press (1915). Pp. xii + 224. \$1.40.

The handbooks of Latin phonology and morphology which have been issued in English are not very numerous. Along with Greek, Latin was treated in King and Cookson's Principles of Sound and Inflection in Greek and Latin (1888) and in the shorter work of the same authors, An Introduction to the Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (1890); also in Victor Henry's Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (translated, from the French, by R. T. Elliott, 1890). Meanwhile, the first two volumes of Brugmann's Grundriss der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Indogermanischen Sprachen had begun to appear in an English version, with some additions and revisions, by Wright, Conway and Rouse, under the title, Elements of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, in five volumes (1888 to 1895). In 1894 The Latin Language of W. M. Lindsay was published; this is the only work in English at all comparable in plan and exhaustiveness with Sommer's Handbuch der Lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre, and with Stolz's Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre, in Volume 2 of Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft¹. Professor Lindsay followed this in 1895 with an abridgment entitled A Short Historical Latin Grammar. In the same year, Professor C. E. Bennett, of Cornell University, published his Appendix to his Latin Grammar, containing a briefer treatment of the phonology and morphology than the preceding, but with very useful chapters on pronunciation, hidden quantity, and orthography. Giles's Short Manual of Comparative Philology for Classical Students also appeared in 1895, and, as its full title indicates, is especially designed for those who are interested in Greek and Latin; a revised edition came out in 1901. Bennett's Appendix appeared in 1907 in a second edition, under the name The Latin Language. Professor Max Niedermann's Précis de phonétique historique du latin was issued in an English version, edited by Professor H. A. Strong and Mr. H. Stewart, entitled Outlines of Latin Phonetics, in 1910; this work has the peculiarity of refraining from the citation of Greek words and forms. Lindsay's Short Historical

¹See THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 4.164; 9.111.